























Would Bohr be born if Bohm were born before Born?
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I discuss a hypothetical historical context in which a Bohm-like deterministic interpretation of
the Schro¨dinger equation could have been proposed before the Born probabilistic interpretation
and argue that in such a context the Copenhagen (Bohr) interpretation would probably have never
achieved great popularity among physicists.
Is this the real life
Is this just fantasy
Caught in a landslide
No escape from reality
Freddie Mercury, “Boh(e)mian Rhapsody”
I. INTRODUCTION
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics
(QM) was the first interpretation of QM that achieved
a significant recognition among physicists. It was pro-
posed very early by the fathers of QM, especially Bohr
and Heisenberg. Later, many other interpretations of
QM were proposed, such as statistical ensemble in-
terpretation, Bohm (pilot wave) interpretation, Nelson
(stochastic dynamics) interpretation, Ghirardi-Rimini-
Weber (spontaneous collapse) interpretation, quantum
logic interpretation, information theoretic interpretation,
consistent histories interpretation, many-world (relative
state) interpretation, relational interpretation, etc. All
these interpretations seem to be consistent with experi-
ments, as well as with the minimal pragmatic “shut-up-
and-calculate interpretation”. Nevertheless, apart from
the minimal pragmatic interpretation, the Copenhagen
interpretation still seems to be the dominating one. Is
it because this interpretation is the simplest, the most
viable, and the most natural one? Or is it just because
of the inertia of pragmatic physicists who do not want
to waste much time on (for them) irrelevant interpreta-
tional issues, so that it is the simplest for them to (un-
critically) accept the interpretation to which they were
exposed first? I believe that the second answer is closer
to the truth. To provide an argument for that, in this
essay I argue that if some historical circumstances had
been only slightly different, then it would have been very
likely that the Bohm deterministic interpretation would
have been proposed and accepted first, and consequently,
that this interpretation would have been dominating even
today.1 (In fact, if the many-world interpretation taken
literally is correct, then such an alternative history of QM
is not hypothetical at all. Instead, it is explicitly realized
in many branches of the whole multi-universe contain-
ing a huge number of parallel universes.) For the sake
of easier reading, in the next section I no longer use the
conditional, but present an alternative hypothetical his-
tory of QM as if it really happened, trying to argue that
such an alternative history was actually quite natural.2
Although a prior knowledge on the Bohm deterministic
interpretation is not required here, for readers unfamiliar
with this interpretation I suggest to read also the original
paper3 or a recent pedagogic review4.
II. AN ALTERNATIVE HISTORY OF
QUANTUM MECHANICS
When Schro¨dinger discovered his wave equation, the
task was to find an interpretation of it. The most ob-
vious interpretation – that electrons are simply waves –
was not consistent because it was known that electrons
behave as pointlike particles in many experiments. Still,
it was known that electrons also obey some wave proper-
ties. What was the most natural interpretation of that?
Of course, the notion of “naturalness” is highly subjec-
tive and strongly depends on personal knowledge, prej-
udices, and current paradigms. At that time, classical
deterministic physics was well understood and accepted,
so it was the most natural to try first with an interpre-
tation that maximally resembles the known principles
of classical mechanics. In particular, classical mechan-
ics contains only real quantities, so it was very strange
that the Schro¨dinger equation describes a complex wave.
Consequently, it was natural to rewrite the Schro¨dinger
equation in terms of real quantities only. The simplest
way to do this was to write the complex wave function ψ
in the polar form ψ = Reiφ and then to write the com-
plex Schro¨dinger equation as a set of two (coupled) real
equations for R(x, t) and φ(x, t). However, such a simple
mathematical manipulation did not immediately reveal
the physical interpretation of R and φ. Fortunately, a






2where S is some new function. The Schro¨dinger equation
for ψ rewritten in terms of R and S turns out to look re-
markably similar to something very familiar from classi-
cal mechanics. One equation looks similar to the classical
Hamilton-Jacobi equation for the function S(x, t), differ-
ing from it only by a transformation
V (x, t)→ V (x, t) +Q(x, t), (2)
where V is the classical potential and










+∇(ρv) = 0 (4)





Thus, at that moment, the most natural interpretation of
the phase of the wave function seemed to be a quantum
version of the Hamilton-Jacobi function that determines
the velocity of a pointlike particle. But what was ρ?
Since one of the equations looks just like the continuity
equation, at the beginning it was proposed that ρ was the
density of particles. That meant that the Schro¨dinger
equation described a fluid consisting of a huge number
of particles. The forces on these particles depended not
only on the classical potential V , but also on the density
ρ through the quantum potential (3) in which R =
√
ρ.5
Although the interpretation above seemed appealing
theoretically, it was very soon realized that it was not
consistent with experiments. It could not explain why,
in experiments, only one localized particle at a single
position was often observed. Thus, ρ could not be the
density of a fluid. It seemed that ρ (or R) must be an
independent continuous field, qualitatively similar to an
electromagnetic or a gravitational field, that, similarly to
an electromagnetic or a gravitational field, influences the
motion of a particle. But why does ρ satisfy the conti-
nuity equation, what is the meaning of this? They could
not answer this question, but they were able to identify a
physical consequence of the continuity equation. To see
this, assume that one studies a statistical ensemble of
particles with the probability distribution of particle po-
sitions equal to some function p(x, t). Assume also that,
for some reason, the initial distribution at t = 0 coin-
cides with the function ρ at t = 0. Then the continuity
equation implies that
p(x, t) = ρ(x, t) (6)
at any t. But why should these two functions coincide
initially? Although nobody was able to present an ab-
solutely convincing explanation, at least some heuristic
arguments were found, based on statistical arguments.6
This suggested that, in typical experiments, ρ could be
equal to the measured probability density of particle po-
sitions. Indeed, it turned out that such a prediction
agrees with experiments. Since this prediction was de-
rived from the natural assumption that each particle has
the velocity determined by (5), it was concluded that ex-
periments confirm (5). Thus, this interpretation became
widely accepted and received the status of an “orthodox”
interpretation.7
However, not everybody was satisfied with this inter-
pretation. In particular, Born objected that there was no
direct experimental evidence for the particle velocities as
given by (5), so this assumption was questioned by him.
As an alternative, he proposed a different interpretation.
In his interpretation, the equality (6) was a fundamental
postulate. Thus, he avoided a need for particle veloci-
ties as given by (5). However, his interpretation has not
been widely accepted among physicists. The arguments
against the Born interpretation were the following: First,
this ad hoc postulate could not explain why the probabil-
ity density was given by ρ. Second, a theory in which the
probabilistic interpretation was one of the fundamental
postulates was completely against all current knowledge
about fundamental laws of physics. The classical deter-
ministic laws were well established, so it was more natural
to accept a deterministic interpretation of QM that dif-
fers from classical mechanics less radically. Third, it was
observed that if one used the arguments of Born to argue
that QM is to be interpreted probabilistically, then one
could use analogous arguments to argue that even clas-
sical mechanics should be interpreted probabilistically,8
which seemed absurd.
Although the Born purely probabilistic interpretation
was not considered very appealing, mainly owing to the
overwhelming mechanistic view of physics of that time,
it was appreciated by some positivists that such an inter-
pretation should not be excluded. The Born interpreta-
tion was quite radical, but still acceptable as a possible
alternative. Indeed, his interpretation seemed to fit well
with a mathematically more abstract formulation of QM
(which started with the Heisenberg matrix formulation
of QM proposed even before the Schro¨dinger equation,
and was further developed by Dirac who formulated the
transformation theory and von Neumann who developed
the Hilbert-space formulation), in which Eq. (5) did not
seem very natural. However, one version of the Born in-
terpretation was much more radical, in fact too radical
to be taken seriously. This new interpretation was sug-
gested by Bohr. In fact, Bohr was already known in the
physics community for proposing the famous Bohr model
of the hydrogen atom, in which electrons move circularly
at discrete distances from the nucleus. Now a much bet-
ter model of the hydrogen atom (the one based on the
Schro¨dinger equation and particle trajectories that it pre-
dicts) was known, so the Bohr model was no longer con-
sidered that important, although it still enjoyed a certain
respect. Since the model by which Bohr achieved respect
3among physicists was based on particle trajectories, it
was really a surprise when Bohr in his new interpreta-
tion proposed that particle trajectories did not exist at
all. But this was not the most radical part of his inter-
pretation. The most radical part was the following: he
proposed that it did not even make sense to talk about
particle properties unless these properties were measured.
An immediate argument against such a proposal was
the well-established classical mechanics, in which parti-
cle properties clearly existed even without measurements.
Bohr argued that there was a separation between the mi-
croscopic quantum world and the macroscopic classical
world, so that the measurement-independent properties
made sense only in the latter. However, Bohr never ex-
plained how and where this separation took place. In
his interpretation, he introduced no new equation. His
arguments were considered pure philosophy, not physics.
Although his arguments were partially inspired by the
widely accepted Heisenberg uncertainty relations, the or-
thodox interpretation of the uncertainty relations (ex-
pressing practical limitations on experiments, rather than
properties of nature itself) seemed more viable. Thus, it
is not a surprise that his interpretation has never been
taken seriously. His interpretation was soon forgotten.
(Much later it was found that the mechanism of decoher-
ence through the interaction with the environment pro-
vides a sort of dynamical separation between “classical”
and “quantum” worlds, but this separation was not ex-
actly what Bohr suggested.9)
Another prominent physicist who criticized the ortho-
dox interpretation of QM was Einstein. He liked the
determinism of orthodox QM (despite the fact he made
contributions to the probabilistic descriptions of quan-
tum processes such as spontaneous emission and pho-
toelectric effect), but there was something else that was
bothering him. To see what, consider a system containing
n particles with positions x1, . . . ,xn described by a sin-
gle wave function ψ(x1, . . . ,xn, t). The n-particle analog
of (3) is a nonlocal function of the form Q(x1, . . . ,xn, t).
In general it is a truly nonlocal function, i.e., not of the
form Q1(x1, t) + . . . + Qn(xn, t), provided that the sys-
tem exhibits entanglement, i.e., that the wave function
is not of the form ψ1(x1, t) · · ·ψn(xn, t). In the orthodox
interpretation such nonlocal Q is interpreted as a non-
local potential that determines forces on particles that
depend on instantaneous positions of all other particles.
This means that entangled spatially separated particles
must communicate instantaneously. Einstein argued that
this is in contradiction with his theory of relativity, be-
cause he derived that no signal can exceed the velocity of
light. Orthodox quantum physicists admitted that this is
a problem for their interpretation, but soon they found a
solution. They observed that the geometric formulation
of relativity does not really exclude superluminal veloci-
ties, unless some additional properties of matter are as-
sumed. Thus, they introduced the notion of tachyons,10
hypothetical particles that can move faster than light and
still obey the geometrical principles of relativity. Einstein
admitted that tachyons are consistent with relativity, but
he objected that this is not sufficient to solve the problem
of instantaneous communication. If the communication
is instantaneous, then it can be so only in one reference
frame. This means that there must be a preferred ref-
erence frame with respect to which the communication
is instantaneous, which again contradicts the principle of
relativity according to which all reference frames should
enjoy the same rights. At that time orthodox quantum
physicists understood relativity sufficiently well to ap-
preciate that Einstein was right. On the other hand, the
theory of relativity was also sufficiently young at that
time, so that it did not seem too heretic to modify or
reinterpret the theory of relativity itself. It was observed
that with a preferred foliation of spacetime specified by
a fixed timelike vector nµ one can still write all quantum
equations in a relativistic covariant form. It was also
observed that, by using an analogy with nonrelativistic
fluids, relativity may correspond only to a low-energy
approximation of a theory with a fundamental preferred
time.11 Thus, it was clear that the preferred foliation of
spacetime does not necessarily contradict the theory of
relativity (both special and general), provided that the
theory of relativity is viewed as an effective theory. At
the beginning, Einstein was not very happy with the idea
that his theory of relativity might not be as fundamental
as he thought. Nevertheless, he finally accepted that QM
is irreducibly nonlocal when he was confronted with the
rigorous mathematical proof that, in QM, the assump-
tion of reality existing even without measurements is not
compatible with locality.12
A new crisis for orthodox QM arose with the devel-
opment of quantum field theory (QFT). At the classi-
cal level, fields are objects very different from particles.
As QFT seemed to be a theory more fundamental than
particle QM, it seemed natural to replace the quantum
particle trajectories with the quantum field trajectories
(or more precisely, time-dependent field configurations).
However, there were two problems with this. First, from
the trajectories of fields, it was not possible to reproduce
the trajectories of particles. Second, the idea of field tra-
jectories did not seem to work for fermionic (anticommut-
ing) fields. Still, the agreement with experiments was not
ruined, as all measurable predictions of QFT were actu-
ally predictions on the properties of particles. Therefore,
it seemed natural to interpret QFT not as a theory of
new more fundamental objects (the fields), but rather
as a more accurate effective theory of particles, in which
fields play only an auxiliary role. Indeed, the divergences
typical of QFT reinforced the view that QFT cannot be
the final theory, but only an effective one.
As quantum physics made further progress, it became
clear that many theories that were considered fundamen-
tal at the beginning turned out to be merely effective the-
ories. This reinforced the dominating paradigm accord-
ing to which relativity is also an effective, approximate
theory. Nevertheless, some relativists still believed that
the principle of relativity was a fundamental principle.
4Consequently, they were not satisfied with the orthodox
interpretation of QM that requires a preferred foliation
of spacetime. Instead they were trying to interpret QM
in a completely local and relativistic manner. To do that,
they were forced to introduce some rather radical views
of nature. In one way or another, they were forced to
assume that a single objective reality did not exist.13
However, such radical interpretations were not very ap-
preciated by the mainstream physicists. It did not seem
reasonable to crucify one of the cornerstones not only
of physics but of the whole of science (the existence of
objective reality) just to save one relatively new theoret-
ical principle (the principle of locality and relativity) for
which there existed good evidence that it could be only an
approximate principle.14 Therefore, the deterministic in-
terpretation of QM survived as the dominating paradigm,
while the probabilistic rules of QM, used widely in practi-
cal phenomenological calculations, were considered emer-
gent, not fundamental. In fact, it has been found that, in
some cases, the probabilistic rules cannot be derived in a
simple way, so that one is forced to use the fundamental
fully deterministic theory explicitly.15
III. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have argued that, in the context of
scientific paradigms that were widely accepted when the
Schro¨dinger equation was discovered, it was much more
natural to propose and accept the Bohmian determinis-
tic interpretation than the Copenhagen interpretation. I
have also argued that, if that had really happened, then
the Bohmian interpretation (or a minor modification of
it) would have been a dominating view even today. In
other words, the answer to the allegoric tongue-twisting
question posed in the title of this paper is – probably no!
This, of course, does not prove that the Bohmian inter-
pretation is more likely to be correct than some other
interpretation. But the point is that it really seems sur-
prising that the history of QM chose a path in which the
Copenhagen interpretation became much more accepted
than the Bohmian one. I leave it to the sociologists and
historians of science to explain why the history of QM
chose the path that it did.
Acknowledgments
The author is grateful to anonymous referees for nu-
merous suggestions for improvements. This work was
supported by the Ministry of Science of the Republic of
Croatia under Contract No. 098-0982930-2864.
∗ Electronic address: hrvoje@thphys.irb.hr
1 A similar thesis with somewhat different arguments has
been also advocated in J. T. Cushing, Quantum Mechan-
ics: Historical Contingency and the Copenhagen Hege-
mony (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994).
2 Remarks concerning the actual history of QM are given in
references.
3 D. Bohm, “A suggested interpretation of the quantum the-
ory in terms of “hidden variables”. I,” Phys. Rev. 85 (2),
166-179 (1952); D. Bohm, “A suggested interpretation of
the quantum theory in terms of “hidden variables”. II,”
Phys. Rev. 85 (2), 180-193 (1952).
4 R. Tumulka, “Understanding Bohmian mechanics: A dia-
logue,” Am. J. Phys. 72 (9), 1220-1226 (2004).
5 Such an interpretation was really proposed already in 1926:
E. Madelung, Z. Phys. 40, 322-326 (1926).
6 These arguments might have looked similar to those in D.
Du¨rr, S. Goldstein, and N. Zangh`ı, “Quantum equilibrium
and the origin of absolute uncertainty,” J. Stat. Phys. 67,
843-907 (1992); A. Valentini, “Signal-locality, uncertainty,
and the subquantum H-theorem,” Phys. Lett. A 156, 5-11
(1991).
7 In reality, this interpretation is known today as the Bohm
interpretation, while the status of an “orthodox” inter-
pretation is enjoyed by a significantly different interpre-
tation. De Broglie has also proposed the same equation
for particle trajectories much earlier than Bohm did, but
de Broglie did not develop a theory of quantum measure-
ments, so he could not reproduce the predictions of stan-
dard QM for observables other than particle positions,
such as particle momenta. For more historical details see
also G. Bacciagaluppi and A. Valentini, Quantum Theory
at the Crossroads: Reconsidering the 1927 Solvay Con-
ference (to be published by Cambridge University Press);
quant-ph/0609184.
8 Such arguments might have looked similar to those in
H. Nikolic´, “Classical mechanics without determinism,”
Found. Phys. Lett. 19, 553-566 (2006). In this paper, it is
shown that classical statistical physics can be represented
by a nonlinear modification of the Schro¨dinger equation,
in which classical particle trajectories may be identified
with special solitonic solutions. A Bohr-like interpretation
of general (not solitonic) solutions suggests that even clas-
sical particles may not have trajectories when they are not
measured, while a measurement of the previously unknown
position may induce an indeterministic wave-function col-
lapse to a solitonic state.
9 For a review of the theory of decoherence with emphasis
on the interpretational issues, see M. Schlosshauer, “De-
coherence, the measurement problem, and interpretations
of quantum mechanics,” Rev. Mod. Phys. 76, 1267-1305
(2004).
10 In reality, tachyons have been introduced in physics some-
what later, see O. M. P. Bilaniuk, V. K. Deshpande, and
E. C. G. Sudarshan, ““Meta” relativity,” Am. J. Phys.
30 (10), 718-723 (1962); O. M. P. Bilaniuk and E. C. G.
Sudarshan, “Particles beyond the light barrier,” Physics
Today 22 (5), 43-51 (1969).
511 It is well known that a wave equation describing the propa-
gation of sound with the velocity cs in a fluid has the same
mathematical form as a special-relativistic wave equation
describing the propagation of light with the velocity c in
vacuum. Consequently, such a wave equation of sound is
invariant with respect to Lorentz transformations in which
the velocity c is replaced by cs. A fluid analogy of curved
spacetime may also be constructed, by introducing an in-
homogeneous fluid. For more details, see, e.g., M. Visser,
“Acoustic black holes: horizons, ergospheres, and Hawking
radiation,” Class. Quant. Grav. 15, 1767-1791 (1998).
12 This proof is now usually attributed to Bell, although other
versions of this proof also exist. For a pedagogic review see
F. Laloe¨, “Do we really understand quantum mechanics?
Strange correlations, paradoxes, and theorems,” Am. J.
Phys. 69 (6), 655-701 (2001).
13 Many of the current interpretations of QM mentioned in
the introduction are of this form.
14 String theory also contains evidence against locality at
the fundamental level. Although the theory is originally
formulated as a local theory, nonlocal features arise in a
rather surprising and counterintuitive manner. It turns out
that string theories defined on different background space-
times may be mathematically equivalent, which suggests
that spacetime is not fundamental at all. Without a fun-
damental notion of spacetime, there is no fundamental no-
tion of locality and relativity as well. It is believed that
a more fundamental formulation of string theory should
remove locality more explicitly, while known local laws of
field theory should emerge as an approximation. See, e.g.,
G. T. Horowitz, “Spacetime in String Theory,” New J.
Phys. 7, 201 (2005); N. Seiberg, “Emergent Spacetime,”
hep-th/0601234.
15 It is known that relativistic QM based on the Klein-Gordon
equation, as well as QFT, do not contain a position op-
erator. Therefore, the conventional interpretation of quan-
tum theory does not have clear predictions on probabilities
of particle positions in the relativistic regime. The funda-
mentally deterministic Bohmian interpretation may lead to
clearer predictions, which means that it may be empirically
richer than (and thus inequivalent to) the conventional for-
mulation. For more details, see, e.g., H. Nikolic´, “Relativis-
tic quantum mechanics and the Bohmian interpretation,”
Found. Phys. Lett. 18, 549-561 (2005); H. Nikolic´, “Is
quantum field theory a genuine quantum theory? Founda-
tional insights on particles and strings,” arXiv:0705.3542.
Unfortunately, experiments that could confirm or reject
such a formulation have not yet been performed. It is also
fair to note that today such a version of the Bohmian in-
terpretation not empirically equivalent to the conventional
interpretation is considered controversial even among the
proponents of the Bohmian interpretation. Nevertheless,
in an alternative history of QM in which the conventional
probabilistic interpretation never became widely accepted,
such a fundamentally deterministic Bohmian interpreta-
tion might have seemed more natural.
